Following the triumph of neoliberalism, trade and investment are considered to be the dominant routes to economic and social development. This has further enhanced the power of transnational corporations. Developing countries are increasingly expected to secure foreign investment to stimulate their economies and lift the local population out of poverty. However, foreign investment also has implications for protection and enjoyment of human rights. Transnational corporations manage their risks by imposing stabilization clauses on host countries that constrain their ability to protect and enhance human rights. Conventional accounting and corporate social responsibility reports seem to be unable to respond to the emerging agenda on human rights. This paper seeks to stimulate debates about the protection and enjoyment of human rights by drawing attention to the way corporations constrain governments and people through clauses in investment agreements. Some evidence is provided through an examination of an investment agreement relating to the Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline project. The paper calls for the production of counter accounts to challenge the hegemony of corporations and create spaces for the enjoyment of human rights.
Introduction
The triumph of neoliberalism (Fukuyama, 1992) and the associated mobility of capital, privatizations, deregulation and a general roll-back of the state has increased corporate influence on the daily lives of the people and their right to food, water, shelter, security, paid employment, safety at work, clean environment and a non-discriminatory environment has deepened calls for greater corporate accountability (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005) . Rather than enhancing democratic control of corporations 1 and aligning corporate conduct with the basic human rights and freedoms, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2 (UDHR), the trend has been to expand the scope of annual accounting reports published by corporations even though they are often a poor medium of corporate accountability (Jones, 2011) . This has been supplemented by a variety of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports (for example, see Bakan, 2004; Banerjee, 2007; Cooper, 2004;  Crowther and Rayman-Bacchus, 2004; Demirag, 2005; Frederick, 2006; Hawkins, 2006; Solomon, 2007) . Some may laud the glossy CSR brochures as evidence of corporate responsiveness to public pressures, but much of this responsiveness is primarily linked to the ability to make profits (Unerman and O"Dwyer, 2007) . There is a suspicion that a large volume of the CSR reports are self-serving (Sikka, 2010) and corporate disclosures are frequently selective and part of the ideological battle to both accommodate and resist change (Adams, 2004; Spence, 2009) . As the chief executive of Unilever put it, "Corporate social responsibility is a hard-edged business decision. Not because it is nice to do or because people are forcing us to do it, or because I want to do nice interviews …, but because it is good for our business … This is a hard-edged business issue." (The Guardian 3 , 5 July 2003).
The tensions between the hard-edged business practices geared to increasing profits for shareholders and the enjoyment of human rights by the people (Amnesty International, 2006; Christian-Aid, 2008; Environmental Defense Fund, 1999; ETC Group, 2008) have persuaded some to argue that corporate power cannot easily be reconciled with democracy and respect for human rights (Hertz, 2001; Bakan, 2004) . Increasingly, there are calls for the development of alternative forms of accounting and "binding legal norms that hold corporations to human rights standards and circumscribe potential abuses of their position of power" (United Nations, 2003, p. 20) .
The corporate responsibility to respect and protect human rights arises from developments in international law (Ratner, 2001; Jochnick, 1999) and obligations arising out of the1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 4 (UDHR) and related treaties 5 and articles promulgated by the United Nations (UN). The UDHR commits all UN member states to respect, protect and enforce the human rights of every individual to a standard of living for adequate health and wellbeing, including the right to food, clothing, medical care, housing and social services. It guarantees that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. No one is to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile and everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to them by law. The UDHR preamble states that it is "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" and requires that 4 This is available at available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 5 The principles of UDHR have been codified into a number of treaties, conventions and binding legal obligations (Cronin-Furman, 2010) . Chief amongst these is the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which covers matters such as the freedom from gender, religious and racial discrimination; right to life, work for a fair wage, education, decent living, housing and food, safe and healthy working conditions, form trade unions and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. The ICESCR is accompanied by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and requires each state to protect the civil and political rights of individuals, including freedom of religion, speech, assembly, association, join a political party, vote, right to life and equality before the law.
"every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction".
The informed legal opinion is that the UDHR reference (see above) to "every individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The
Universal Declaration applies to them all" (International Council on Human
Rights Policy, 2002, p. 159) . Thus obligations to respect and protect human rights and provide a remedy for injured parties rests not only on the state but also on corporations 6 (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2008), considered to be an important "organ of society" (see above).
The focus on corporations arises from the intensification of globalization and the related increase in the power of corporations. Transnational corporations are now a key source of cross-border investment and their quest for private profits frequently brings them in conflict with workers and local communities (Korten, 2001; Klein, 2001) . Developing countries may welcome foreign investment to generate jobs and economic development, but it can also have an adverse effect on enjoyment of human rights, including labour rights, security, sovereignty of the state and even the right to life. Corporations have been accused of lax health and safety standards and inflicting death and injuries on innocent people (Hanna et al, 2005) . By avoiding taxes, corporations deprive governments of scarce resources which could be used to develop social infrastructure and improve the quality of life of people by providing education, healthcare, security and pensions (Global Witness, 2006; Christian-Aid, 2008) . In pursuit of profits, some corporations have also colluded with murderous and corrupt regimes (Black, 2001; Rowell et al., 2005; Clark, 1994) . Yet the quality of corporate profits and their consequences 6 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommends that "enterprises should … respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government"s international obligations and commitments" (OECD, 2000, p. 11) . However, its recommendations are non-binding and considered to be "weak" (Ratner, 2001, p. p. 457) .
for human rights is not evident from annual financial reports or glossy CSR brochures.
This paper seeks to encourage debates about corporate power and human rights and calls for the accounting and corporate social responsibility literature to connect with human rights. It highlights concerns about intensification of globalization and the rising power of corporations through an examination of the risk-management strategies used by transnational corporations. These include placing constraints, known as stabilization clauses, on the ability of many developing countries to protect human rights by disabling their capacity to develop regulation, levy taxes; improve labour, health and safety and environmental standards and constraining their citizens from seeking remedies in local courts of law. This paper illustrates and discusses the above issues by firstly examining the nature of contemporary globalization, which has facilitated economic growth, but also generated vast income and wealth inequalities. The dominant discourses persuade poorer countries to alleviate poverty by inviting foreign trade and investment. However, such processes also pose serious questions about the protection and enjoyment of human rights. The next section provides an illustration of the stabilization clauses through an examination of an investment agreement relating to the ChadCameroon oil and pipeline project. After discussing some of the social and political issues raised by the constraints it considers implications of the stabilization clauses for accounting and accountability. The final section then reflects upon the paper and calls for sustained research to advance human rights.
Globalization and Foreign Investment
Corporations are a major centre of power in contemporary capitalism. From its very inception capitalism was meant to be a global affair (Marx and Engels, 2002 . Nearly 70% of the world trade and 80%-90% of the foreign direct investment is controlled by just 500 corporations and a mere 1% of corporations own half the total stock of foreign direct investment (Korten, 2001; Rugman, 2005 Also see the website of Share The World's Resources (http://www.stwr.org/multinational-corporations/multinational-corporationsmncs-beyond-the-profit-motive.html; accessed on 13 May 2010) 8 http://www.stwr.org/imf-world-bank-trade/reforming-international-trade.html Through trade, mergers and acquisitions, corporations have not only acquired vast monopoly powers, but with it also the power to shift jobs, investment, taxes and the power to discipline states. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2000) , just 20 corporations control the global coffee trade; only 3 account for over 80% of the global cocoa trade; 6 of them hold 70% of wheat trade and one controls 98% of the production of packed tea. Just 10 global corporations control 55% of the global trade in pharmaceuticals; 67% of the trade in seed and fertilisers; 55% of the pharmaceutical trade; and 66% of the global biotechnology industry (ETC Group, 2008) . By any standard transnational corporations wield considerable power and their intervention in large scale trade and investment is unavoidable even though their commitment to any locality, product and people is temporary and conditional upon profits.
The intensification of globalization is accompanied by extreme inequalities. A 2006 UN report estimated that the richest 1% of adults, mostly resident in the West, own more than 40% of the planet's wealth and a mere 10% command 85% of the world total of global assets, but the bottom 50% own just 1%.(the Guardian, 6 December 2006; also see Davies et al., 2008) . At the same time, around 2.1 billion people, mostly living in mineral rich developing countries, survive on less than $2 a day and 880 million on less than $1 a day (World Bank, 2008) . More than 1 billion people do not have access to safe drinking water. About 1.9 million people die every year from diarrheal diseases and around 1.5 million (or 5,000 a day) of the fatalities are children under the age of five (Water Aid, 2007) . A child born in a less developed country is almost 14 times more likely to die during the first 28 days of life than a child born in an industrialized country. Low-income countries provide an average 10 beds per 10,000 people compared to 63 in Europe. Around 80% of maternal deaths could be averted if women had access to essential maternity and basic healthcare services. The infant mortality rate 9 for Finland, France, Germany, UK and US is 3.7, 4.2, 4.3, 4.8 and 6.3 respectively, whilst for Angola, Congo, China, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Tanzania the rates are 131.9, 70.3, 23.0, 56.6, 55.0, 109.5 and 72.6 respectively (United Nations, 2007) . Out of an estimated 9 The number of deaths of infants below the age of one in a given year per 1,000 live births in the same year.
total of 2.2 billion children, over 1 billion live in poverty (UNICEF, 2004 (Gianturco, 2001 ). Such support is often driven by domestic economic and employment considerations and rarely requires the transnational corporation to conduct its foreign operations in a manner which 10 Another reason for the state support is that the private sector is often unwilling or unable to solely underwrite the risks associated with foreign trade.
will fulfil the home and the host state"s obligations under the UDHR to protect and respect human rights.
There is the issue of political risks and unilateral actions by the host governments, especially as after huge expenditure the investing company cannot easily abandon the project and is at the mercy of the host government.
Corporate foreign investment is conditional upon generating acceptable returns, which in turn are dependent upon assumptions about wage rates, pension contributions, taxes, environmental, energy, regulatory, transport levies and a variety of other costs for the duration of the project, which could last for decades. In response to domestic pressures, the host government may make concessions to its citizens, and in the process alter costs and profits expected by investors. In addition, it is also possible that for ideological, Investment (MAI), and the proposed rules seemed to limit the sovereign powers of the host states and advance the power of transnational corporations at the expense of human rights, democracy, labour and environmental standards (see Picciotto and Mayne, 1999; Arnold, 2005) . The rules placed limits on the powers of governments to support domestic companies and restricted their powers in directing or discriminating against foreign companies in sensitive areas (e.g. defence, environment, security sensitive regions, forested areas). The rules also legitimised the creation of international arbitration panels (rather than the host countries" courts) to adjudicate on disputes and enabled corporations to sue elected governments for introducing laws (e.g. healthcare, pensions, and environment) which could be detrimental to corporate profits. In the face of organized opposition from civil society and non-governmental organizations, the MAI negotiations were abandoned (Neumayer, 1999; Tieleman, 2000) . In many ways, the MAI framework legitimised the conditions already imposed upon developing countries, and the collapse of the negotiations did not lead to any new enlightened global framework for protecting human rights, though negotiations continue (for example see, United Nations Human Rights Council, 2009).
Meanwhile, the nature of foreign investment agreements (these are directly between the host governments and transnational corporations) and bilateral investment treaties (these are mainly between governments) primarily rests upon the relative bargaining strength of the parties involved and established norms. Since the early twentieth-century US companies have inserted stabilization clauses in foreign investment contracts agreements with developing countries. Early clauses tended to ban the host state from nationalising the project and/or required the consent of both contracting parties to modify the investment contract, but gradually the scope of the clauses has been broadened to stabilize or freeze specific aspects of a project, including its fiscal and regulatory regime. Such clauses come in many varieties and are now widely used by transnational corporations to manage the non-commercial risks (fiscal, regulatory, political) by stabilizing or freezing the terms and conditions of a project (Leader, 2006; Shemberg, 2008; Nwaokoro, 2010; Černič, 2010) . They generally guarantee the investors (mostly in the West) that the domestic laws affecting the investment will remain unchanged, or frozen, during the lifetime of the project. The clauses either do not allow new laws to apply to the project, or force host governments to compensate investors for compliance with new laws, especially where they erode the returns promised to investors (Cotula, 2008) . The clauses are usually accompanied by arrangements for arbitration. Such clauses constrain the ability of a sovereign state to legislate, protect human rights and meet its international obligations. Given the obvious conflicts, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has called for a balance to be struck "between the legitimate commercial expectations of an investor party and the right of a host country party to oversee the evolution of the resulting relationship in a manner that is consistent with national development policies 11 " (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 45) . However, the investment agreements and treaties are ultimately shaped by asymmetries of power and are often found to be "one-sided instruments. They are concerned with limiting the measures that may be taken by governments against foreign investors or foreign owned investments. The treaties contain a series of rights for inward capitalprotection against expropriation, guarantees of non-discrimination, and freedom to transfer funds out of a host state -but they lack any counterbalancing investor responsibilities" (Peterson, 2006, p. 20) .
The investor agreements tend to be confidential, but in recent years some have attracted the attention of civil society and non-governmental organizations. One such agreement related to the development of ChadCameroon oil and pipeline project and illustrates the concerns outlined above.
The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline

The Investment Project and Agreements
At more than US$3.5 billion The consortium planned to produce and export around 225,000 barrels of oil a day, mostly to Europe and the USA. Most of the 1,070 kilometre (650 mile) pipeline had to be built underground (which makes leakage difficult to detect) and pass through virgin rainforest that has been the traditional home for a Over their 25-year production span, the first three oil fields in southern Chad may earn the government more than $5 billion in oil revenues" (Gary and Reisch, 2005 , p.1) 16 As per an IFC fact sheet (http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/eir.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ChadCameroonPipeline1/ $FILE/CHAD+CAMEROON+PIPELINE+FACT+SHEET.pdf; accessed 26 Jun 2010). The project had the potential to provide economic development, but it also had the potential to cause loss of farmlands, sustainable livelihoods, displacement of communities and the accompanying loss of cultural identities.
In particular, the project posed challenges for the wellbeing of the indigenous peoples" "right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions … rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty … right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture" and the state"s obligations to "provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for … Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources … Any form of forced population transfer" (United Nations, 2008, p. 5).
Right from the beginning, civil society organisations were concerned that the revenues could be misused, may not go to the regions affected by the development or be used to alleviate poverty or build social infrastructure. To pacify critics and address possible concerns about corruption, the World Bank negotiated a deal under which the net incomes due to Cameroon and Chad were to be deposited into a bank account in London, pending audits.
Some 10% of the revenues were earmarked for a Future Generations Fund and civil society representatives and a member of the opposition were to be part of a monitoring board. The project had to meet the World Bank"s safeguard policies on environmental assessments and resettlements, and two national parks were to be created to compensate for the loss of a small forest.
In 1998, the Chadian government introduced the Oil Revenues Management Act and under this more than 80% of the project revenues were to be invested The Chad agreement gives the oil companies powers associated with exploration, extraction and transportation of oil, use of roads, clay, sand and occupation of land. The consortium promises to indemnify people for the damage but the terms and the nature of damage are not specified (Leader, 2006) . The investment agreement provides that the "Consortium must conform scrupulously … to the laws and regulations of the Republic of Chad insofar as the Convention does not indicate otherwise", but an accompanying clause adds that "All references to these laws and regulations throughout this Convention will not be interpreted in any way that either directly or indirectly increases the obligations and [financial burdens] imposed on the Consortium by this Convention, nor will it prejudice the rights and economic advantages of the Consortium as they are provided for by the present Convention" (cited in Leader, 2006, p. 78 and footnote 66).
In the case of Chad, disputes were to be decided by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce
26
. The arbitrator can have regard to the domestic law but may often be under specific instructions from the contract.
The Chad/Cameroon project instructs that the interpretation must not "… prejudice the rights and economic advantages of the investor" (cited in Leader, 2006, p. 677) . The project had considerable positives as the World Bank set-up oversight panels and involved civil society panels in monitoring the project, but the outcomes were very different. Nguiffo (2005) notes that when NGOs and local communities raised concerns about workers" rights, the World Bank Inspection Panel told them that worker rights did not fall under its mandate.
Agreements for both Chad and
The Panel also told them that it did not have a policy on contractual business 26 The International Chamber of Commerce has permanent observer status with the United Nations. 27 Governments fearful of upsetting investors may voluntarily minimise the risk of disputes and thus dilute their actions for protecting human rights.
relationships between the consortium and small local businesses. Although policies existed on access to water and compensation, the Inspection Panel told the communities that they had to first prove the quality of their water was negatively affected. Since the communities had no access to prior scientific evidence to support their case, most of the complaints were dismissed due to lack of evidence. Farmers in Cameroon complained that they did not receive adequate compensation for loss of farms and land. The compensation for the loss of raffia trees was 120 times below their market value (Environmental Defense Fund, 1999, p. 6). Fewer than 5% of the Bagyéli people affected by the pipeline secured any paid employment on the pipeline project. They One of the "crimes" for which he was charged and tortured was his opposition to the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline. President Déby used part of his $25 million signing-on bonus from oil companies to buy arms for his supporters.
The inauguration of the pipeline prompted a national day of mourning by civil groups in Chad as many villagers claimed that the project had denied them access to clean water, farmers were unable to access their lands, and due to oil spillage fish stocks off Cameroon"s coast had been depleted. The 
Some Issues Relating to Stabilization Clauses
The stabilization clauses inserted in the Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline project raise some fundamental questions about protection of human rights, the citizens right to seek redress in a court of law, the ability of sovereign governments to enact laws and develop a regulatory capacity, the power and accountability of transnational corporations, their home countries and much more. The stabilization clauses draw attention to the unevenness of economic globalization as they seem to be primarily imposed on developing countries.
Shemberg"s survey of 88 agreements notes that "the stabilization clauses in non-OECD countries are more likely than those in OECD countries to limit the application of new social and environmental laws to the investments" (Shemberg, p. 39 "All business organizations, in the private and public sectors alike, are subject to changes in law and generally have to deal with the consequences that such changes may have for business …General changes in law may be regarded as an ordinary business risk rather than a risk specific to the concessionaire"s activities and it may be difficult for the Government to undertake to protect infrastructure operators from the economic and financial consequences of changes in legislation that affect other business organizations equally. Thus, there may not be a prima facie reason why the concessionaire should not bear the consequences of general legislative risks, including the risk of costs arising from changes in law applying to the whole business sector" (p.141). 30 There are rare alternative examples. Under pressure from NGOs, UKbased oil company BP published the private investment contracts (see http://www.bp.com/lubricanthome.do?categoryId=6070) underpinning a major cross-border pipeline project known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The company subsequently amended (in 2003 and 2005 ) the contracts to include "Human Rights Undertaking" (Shemberg, 2008) and address some of the problems identified by human rights advocates (also see Amnesty International, 2003; Baku-Ceyhan Campaign, 2005) . Following a campaign by NGOs, Mittal Steel also revised some of its stabilization clauses (Global Witness, 2006) . However, the Chad-Cameroon agreement has not been amended.
The home countries of transnational corporations have facilitated foreign investment through the provision of insurance and export credit facilities.
Despite their obligations under the UDHR to respect and protect human rights they are content for the stabilization clauses to be imposed on poorer countries which would be utterly unacceptable in their own territorial jurisdiction.
Despite the comparatively poor record of Chad and Cameroon on corruption and human rights, the agreement drafted by the consortium did not include clauses to protect human rights. Civil society organizations have argued that foreign investment should be preceded by commitments to protect human rights and institutional structures that build the host state"s capacity to protect human rights (Environmental Defense Fund, 1999; Amnesty International, 2003 , Gary and Reisch, 2005 Global Witness, 2006) . Though the World Bank took some steps to protect some revenues for improving social infrastructure the process does not seem to have worked well, possibly because the stabilization clauses disabled the state and corporations did not prioritise the protection of human rights in their investment decisions.
Historically, the state is expected to protect human rights and provide remedies for the injured citizens, but it cannot easily tackle discrimination at work, gender rights, and rights of minorities without developing appropriate systems of corporate governance, law enforcement and a capacity to investigate suspect practices. However, the opt-outs granted by stabilization clauses do not enable the host countries to develop regulatory capacity, or the ability to monitor corporate activities, identify transgressions and meet their human rights obligations. Consequently, the host states may be inclined not to honour international human rights obligations and thus hamper the development of international standards.
In Chad and Cameroon, some farmers and indigenous people have The state"s obligation to prevent corporations (third parties) from breaching human rights rests upon the assumption that it can exercise its sovereign right to enact laws and build capacities to regulate important areas of public policy.
However, the ability of poor developing countries to meet these obligations is hampered by stabilization clauses, which could remain in effect for 50-70 years, and can limit their capacity to fulfil present and future obligations under their constitution and international treaties.
To facilitate clean water the state may have to impose levies on the oil consortium, or impose stringent environment safeguards and in the process change the profits expected by the investors who will then invoke the clauses in the agreements and demand compensation. The state now faces the dilemma of either preserving the sanctity of the investment agreement or neglecting its human rights obligations. Often poor states will not have the means to conduct the necessary tests to establish the levels of pollution in water supply, rivers and lakes and even if they could they may not be in a position to apply the principle of the "polluter pays For any state to hold a corporation to account it needs to develop a legal infrastructure, but under the investment agreements the disputes are referred to international arbitration panels. The courts in Chad and Cameroon are not allowed to develop capacities to hear complex arguments, or question the relative neglect of human rights in investment agreements. As a result, it becomes difficult to build the legal expertise and train judges and lawyers to 31 Recently, The UK-based oil company Oil giant BP has been persuaded by the US government to put $20bn (£13.5bn) in a compensation fund for victims of the Gulf oil spill and company ahs also agreed not to pay dividend to its shareholders (BBC News, 17 June 2010; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/us_and_canada/10335114.stm). 32 As per the World Bank statistics (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf; accessed 3 July 2010) 33 As per the company"s annual financial statements.
craft new laws and investigative capacities. The judgement of arbitration panels is based upon interpretation of clauses in investment agreements rather than any domestic law or the host state"s human rights obligations.
The right to an effective recourse in a domestic court of law is a key element of human rights guarantees. However, the stabilization clauses obstruct the possibilities of a legal remedy. The affected people have little or no recourse against the oil companies because they are not a direct party to the contract and often will not know the identity and standing of numerous sub-contractors and financiers involved on the project. The oil consortium claims to voluntarily apply the highest ethical and environmental standards, but they are always vague and capable of being easily diluted to meet commercial imperatives and do not give the local population any enforceable rights. The investing companies can make these standards as high sounding as possible, but they are not enforceable in any local court because they are not written into any drains the scarce resources available for economic and social development.
Governments fearful of upsetting corporations may well resort to strong-arm tactics to quell demands for social change. The stabilization clauses prioritise commercial interests over concerns about social justice and inhibit the state from meeting demands for the protection of human rights.
In principle, the host government could develop a two-tier system of laws: one applying to the enclave of the project and another for the rest of the country, but this is divisive and a recipe for social resentment and conflicts. (Johnson, 1972; Puxty, 1986) . The accounting calculations inoculate management from consideration of the social costs of profits. The emphasis, for example in the income statement, is on celebrating the victory of capital on other social constituencies and appeasing markets by reporting higher profits.
The social consequences are frequently considered to be externalities and little attempt is made to incorporate social costs into any business decision (Bebbington et al., 2001 Governance, 1992; Financial Reporting Council, 2010) and international accounting and auditing standards.
Perhaps, oil companies respond to concerns about human rights in their corporate social responsibility reports. Therefore, the 2009 CSR report of ExxonMobil was examined. It emphasised that the company promotes "respect for human rights and serves as a positive influence in communities where we operate" (ExxonMobil, 2010, p. 44) . The report mentions that the company is making economic contribution to the development of Chad and Cameroon by empowering women, supporting small businesses, facilitating local supply chains, leadership and skills training and making people aware of health hazards, such as malaria. However, the 52 page report does not provide any information about the stabilization clauses in its investment agreements or their impact on the local population. The 48 page social responsibility report published by Chevron states that the company is "deeply committed to conducting business in a socially responsible and ethical manner, and this report outlines our efforts to continually improve our performance and practices" (Chervron, 2010, p. ii) . Interestingly, in contrast to the emerging literature (for example see, Jochnick, 1999; Ratner, 2001; Peterson, 2006; Cronin-Furman, 2010 ) the company pins the prime responsibility for protection of human rights on the state by adding that "Although governments have the primary duty to protect and ensure human rights, Chevron recognizes that it has a responsibility to respect human rights and can play a positive role in communities where we operate" (Chervron, 2010, p. 39) . The company provides a lot of positive news about its healthcare, environmental and education projects, but nothing about any stabilization clauses that it has imposed through its investment agreements or whether any of its commercial programmes have yielded negative outcomes for the local population. The selectiveness of information is consistent with prior research which notes that the disclosures are dependent upon management discretion and are primarily driven by a business case for supporting social responsibility initiatives (for example, see Adams, 2004; Unerman and O"Dwyer, 2007) . Given corporate obsessions of presenting themselves in good light, it is unlikely that companies will ever voluntarily reveal the negative social impact of their operations. There are calls interventions by the state to draft legislative frameworks to demand more meaningful information (Archel et al., 2009) Oil companies operate in societies marked by inherent antagonisms. The structural contradictions cannot be dissolved by conventional accounting or CSR reports (Puxty, 1996) . The silences in the official media have persuaded the marginalised to mobilise others and give visibility to their concerns through competing discourses amplified by leaflets, oratory, street-theatre, music, art and comedy (Thompson, 1968; Cooper et al., 2005; Spence, 2009 ). In the case examined here, social accounts of the stabilization clauses in the ChadCameroon investment agreements and their impact on the lives of ordinary people were provided by civil society organisations (for example, Amnesty International, 2003 International, , 2005 International, , 2006 Environmental Defense Fund, 1999; Friends of the earth, 2007) . They used publicly available information as well as the contents of the investor agreements to construct an alternative account that specifically focused on human rights of the affected people. In this process, they were assisted by public spirited lawyers and academics. The social accounts sought to corroborate corporate claims with the lived experiences of the individuals directly affected and found them to be deficient. The civil society organisations visited remote parts of the countries, organised and attended public meetings, collected testimonies and engaged with the oil companies, the World Bank, the IMF and other institutions to create possibilities of public scrutiny. The increased public sensitivities may not have diluted the stabilization clauses in the Chad-Cameroon agreements 38 , but the resulting dynamic dialogue has created space for possible reforms of investor agreements and stabilization clauses (Shemberg, 2008; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2009 ). The social accounts signalled that corporate practices will be resisted and exposed. Such engagements may also persuade companies to broaden the scope of their CSR reports as continued silence may signal dishonesty and callousness. Nevertheless, social accounts, rest upon the mobilisation of adequate financial, human and legal resources for civil society organisations and they are under constant pressure of enrolment and inducement of corporate sponsorships (Gray, Bebbington and Collison, 2006) .
Summary and Discussion
Foreign investment and trade is an inevitable feature of contemporary economic globalization and has strengthened the power of transnational corporations. This paper has sought to draw attention to some of the challenges that it poses for the enjoyment and protection of human rights through a partial examination of a foreign investment agreement 39 . It specifically drew attention to the impact of stabilization clauses which raise major legal, political, social, ethical and moral issues (for an indication see, Amnesty International 2005 Leader, 2006; Cotula, 2008; Macleod, 2008; Neumayer, 1999; United Nations Human Rights Council, 2008 Černič, 2010) . Stabilization clauses are a reminder of the way profits are 38 Under pressure from civil society organisations, UK-based oil company BP published the private investment contracts (see http://www.bp.com/lubricanthome.do?categoryId=6070) relating to a major cross-border pipeline project known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The company subsequently amended (in 2003 and 2005 ) the contracts to include "Human Rights Undertaking" (Shemberg, 2008) and addressed some of the problems identified by human rights advocates (see Amnesty International, 2003; Baku-Ceyhan Campaign, 2005) . Following a campaign by NGOs, Mittal Steel also revised some of its stabilization clauses (Global Witness, 2006) . However, the Chad-Cameroon agreement has not been amended. 39 It may be argued that investment and trade per se are not necessarily the cause of human rights problems or violations, but rather the agreements have effects which encourage governments and corporations to ignore human rights obligations, or constrain governments from taking steps to improve human rights. prioritised and human rights are marginalised in business practices. The neoliberal project insists that civil and political freedoms are a necessary byproduct of economic growth, but the Chad-Cameroon project examined in this paper shows that corporations view economic growth purely in terms of financial and contractual obligations. One might argue that economic, social, cultural and political rights are a necessary condition for reduction of poverty, economic stability and enabling citizens to live fulfilling lives, but they are excluded from investment agreements.
The rise of corporate power has compromised the autonomy of the state and constrained its ability to pursue what could be regarded as national priorities or citizens" rights. These developments have not been accompanied by changes in corporate accounting and accountability practices. One might look to accounting academics for advances that might humanise accounting, but such prospects remain poor, especially as a large volume of research published in leading academic journals privileges narrow technocratic issues and is rarely concerned with "an examination of the accounting issues associated with new forms of financial and economic transaction[s] …" (Unerman and O"Dwyer, 2010, p. 19) . It is also doubtful that accounting and CSR developments can dilute the systemic pressures to report higher earnings or the executive quest for greater financial rewards, which are the key drivers of foreign investment, stabilization clauses and subordination of human rights to profits (Puxty, 1986 their projects "whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it … take proactive steps to understand how existing and proposed activities may affect human rights" (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2008, paras 25, 61) . The framework recommends that corporations should provide the "means for those who believe they have been harmed to bring this to the attention of the company and seek remediation, without prejudice to legal channels available" (United Nations Human Rights council, 2008, para 82).
More interestingly, the UN framework recommends that member states should "foster a corporate culture respectful of human rights at home and abroad"
(para 27). The difficulty with the above proposals is that due to the impact of The need to make corporations accountable for human rights opens up rich possibilities for research (for some discussion see Jochnick, 1999; Neu and Cooper, 2001; Cooper, 2005; Gray and Bebbington, 2006; Macleod, 2008; Spence 2009 ). Scholarly research can play a pivotal role in advancing novel discourses, giving visibility to the plight of the 
